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INTRODUCTION
Drug compounding is the practice of mixing, combining, or altering
drug ingredients to create a product that meets the medical needs of a
patient whose needs cannot otherwise be met with commercially-
available products. Compounding is essential for patients that are al-
lergic to certain ingredients or cannot tolerate the route of administra-
tion or dosage form of a commercially-available drug. Compounding
may also enable pharmacists to supply medications when there is a
shortage of commercially-available drugs. For example, amid the na-
tionwide shortage of generic liquid Tamiflu and growing flu deaths in
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
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early 2018, pharmacists around the country used Tamiflu capsules to
compound a liquid version of the drug.1
Although drug compounding fills a critical need for many patients,
it has also given rise to significant drug safety concerns, fraud, and
anticompetitive practices. Every year, many patients experience harm-
ful side effects and even death from compounded drugs that are con-
taminated or made in excessive potency because of pharmacist error.
The ability of pharmacies to make and dispense drugs outside of the
typical channels has also given rise to extensive fraud. Pharmacists,
doctors, and company executives are routinely prosecuted for schemes
to defraud insurers and the federal government into paying hundreds
of millions of excess dollars for compounded drugs. In addition, some
rogue pharmacies earn significant profits by mass-producing com-
pounded drugs that are essentially copies of commercially-available
drugs. These facilities put patients at risk by needlessly exposing them
to unapproved drugs and jeopardize drug innovation by reducing
manufacturers’ incentives to invest in the development of new
products.
Many of the drug safety problems, fraudulent practices, and an-
ticompetitive behaviors are facilitated by regulatory gaps in the over-
sight of drug compounding. Traditional drug manufacturers must
prove that their drugs are safe and effective and manufactured in ac-
cordance with current good manufacturing practices (CGMPs) in or-
der to obtain U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. In
contrast, compounders need not obtain FDA approval for their drugs
before selling them, and most compounders do not have to produce
drugs in accordance with CGMPs. Moreover, traditional drug manu-
facturing facilities are subject to routine inspection by the FDA to en-
sure they comply with CGMPs and there are no other safety or quality
concerns. In contrast, most compounders are not primarily overseen
by the FDA but by state boards of pharmacy that are less consistent in
their oversight—in fact, fewer than half of the states conduct routine
inspections of compounding pharmacies. Finally, whereas traditional
manufacturers are required to report adverse events involving their
drugs to the FDA, most compounders do not have to report adverse
events to either the FDA or state regulatory authorities.
This Article explains the regulatory gaps in drug compounding that
give rise to drug safety problems, fraud, and anticompetitive behavior.
1. Elizabeth Weise, Liquid Flu Drug Tamiflu in Short Supply in Some Areas, USA TODAY
(Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/10/tamiflu-flu-drug-
shortage/1820373/.
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It also proposes various measures that could be taken to close the
gaps in order to protect patients, payors, and innovation.
I. BACKGROUND ON DRUG COMPOUNDING
Drug compounding is the alteration of a drug or drug ingredient
into a form that meets the medical needs of a patient that cannot oth-
erwise be met with an FDA-approved product. In these situations,
pharmacists (or physicians) may mix, combine, or alter the ingredients
into a more appropriate compounded drug product. For example, pa-
tients may require compounded drug products if they are allergic to a
particular ingredient in an approved drug, cannot tolerate the particu-
lar taste of an approved drug, or require a different dosage form such
as a liquid instead of a tablet. Compounding serves an important pur-
pose in ensuring that patients with unique needs receive medically-
appropriate drugs.2
All pharmacists receive training in simple compounding, and most
pharmacies occasionally perform basic compounding services when
patients present a valid prescription for a compounded drug. How-
ever, whereas just a few decades ago pharmacy compounding was lim-
ited to local pharmacists making medically-necessary drugs for
individual patients, today many compounders are involved in large-
scale production and multistate distribution of compounded prod-
ucts.3 Currently, over 65% of independent pharmacies engage in com-
pounding,4 and approximately 7,500 pharmacies across the country
specialize in preparing compounded drugs.5 Over 40 million com-
pounded prescriptions are dispensed each year,6 earning over $6 bil-
lion annually. This revenue is expected to double by 2024.7
2. AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45069, DRUG COMPOUNDING: FDA AU-
THORITY AND POSSIBLE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2018).
3. Janet Woodcock & Julie Dohm, Toward Better-Quality Compounded Drugs — An Update
from the FDA, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2509, 2509 (2017).
4. Craig Ruark, Compound Pharmacies Spread to Meet Need for Customized Prescriptions in
Southern Nevada, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS (Sept. 11, 2016), https://businesspress.vegas/economy/
small-business/compound-pharmacies-spread-to-meet-need-for-customized-prescriptions-in-
southern-nevada/.
5. Frequently Asked Questions About Pharmaceutical Compounding, AM. PHARMACISTS
ASS’N, http://www.pharmacist.com/frequently-asked-questions-about-pharmaceutical-com
pounding (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
6. See Ruark, supra note 4.
7. Global Markets Insights, Inc., Compounding Pharmacies Market to Cross More than $12
Billion by 2024, PRNEWSWIRE (June 6, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/com
pounding-pharmacies-market-to-cross-more-than-12-billion-by-2024-global-market-insights-inc-
626705911.html.
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This expanding practice has, effectively, outgrown the laws designed
to regulate it. Before explaining the gaps in the regulation of com-
pounding pharmacies, this Section describes the significant drug safety
concerns, fraud, and anticompetitive behavior that plague the
industry.
A. Adverse Events
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires that
the FDA approve all new drugs as “safe” and “effective” before the
drugs are marketed for sale.8 However, although compounded drugs
are new drugs, Congress has deemed it infeasible for pharmacists to
obtain approval for each compounded drug made to meet the unique
needs of an individual patient.9 As a result, compounded drugs are not
evaluated for safety, efficacy, or quality prior to sale, making them
inherently riskier than traditional new drugs. In addition to the
greater inherent risk of compounded drugs, most compounding facili-
ties are not held to the same quality standards as traditional manufac-
turing facilities. The lax oversight of these facilities has resulted in
numerous instances of contamination, pharmacist error, and generally
unsanitary conditions.
Several adverse events involving compounded drugs have resulted
in serious patient injury and death. One of the most tragic events in-
volving compounded drugs occurred in 2012 when contaminated ster-
oid injections compounded at the New England Compounding Center
in Massachusetts caused a fungal meningitis outbreak that sickened
over 753 people and caused 64 deaths in Massachusetts.10 That same
year, a compounding pharmacy in Florida dispensed contaminated
eye medications that caused fungal eye infections, vision loss, or both
in 47 patients.11 A year earlier, a compounding pharmacy in Alabama
sold contaminated intravenous (IV) fluids that resulted in 19 cases of
bacterial infections, 9 of which resulted in death.12 Between 2001 and
8. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
9. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369–70 (2002) (“[I]t would not make
sense to require compounded drugs created to meet the unique needs of individual patients to
undergo the testing required for the new drug approval process. . . . Pharmacists do not make
enough money from small-scale compounding to make safety and efficacy testing of their com-
pounded drugs economically feasible, so requiring such testing would force pharmacists to stop
providing compounded drugs.”).
10. Multistate Outbreak of Fungal Meningitis and Other Infections, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis.html.
11. Christina A. Mikosz et al., Fungal Endophthalmitis Associated with Compounded Prod-
ucts, 20 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 248, 248 (2014).
12. Tom Watkins, Contaminated IV Solution Suspected in 9 Patient Deaths in Alabama, CNN
(Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/03/29/alabama.hospitals.deaths.
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2012, over 40 adverse events were reported at compounding pharma-
cies, resulting in over 1,100 reported cases of serious injury and 115
deaths.13 The vast majority of these adverse events were caused by
either contamination or drugs compounded with potency far in excess
of the recommended strength.
In response to these adverse events, and especially the 2012 fungal
meningitis outbreak, Congress enacted the Compounding Quality Act
as part of the Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013 (DQSA).14 As I
describe more fully in Section III, this Act amended the FDCA by
dividing compounding pharmacies into two categories with separate
regulatory oversight requirements.
Despite the increased regulatory oversight provided by the DQSA,
drug compounding continues to produce adverse events. Many recent
adverse events result from contamination in the preparation and han-
dling of compounded drugs. For example, in 2016, contamination of
IV solutions at a compounding pharmacy in New York caused fungal
bloodstream infections in 17 patients and resulted in 2 deaths.15 Simi-
larly, in 2017, 43 patients experienced vision loss after receiving eye
injections dispensed from a compounding pharmacy in Texas.16 Upon
investigation of the pharmacy, the FDA noted that their “drug prod-
ucts intended or expected to be sterile were prepared, packed, or held
under insanitary conditions, whereby they may have become contami-
nated with filth or rendered injurious to health.”17
Adverse events also result from compounding errors such as the
preparation of over- or under-potent drugs. As an example, in 2016,
three infants were injected with opioid drugs distributed from an Indi-
ana compounding pharmacy that were 25 times the recommended
strength.18 That same year, seven patients developed a thyroid condi-
13. U.S. Illnesses and Deaths Associated with Compounded Medications or Repackaged Medi-
cations, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June 23, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-vis
ualizations/2017/us-illnesses-and-deaths-associated-with-compounded-medications-or-repack
aged-medications.
14. Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (Supp. V 2018)).
15. Amber M. Vasquez et al., Notes from the Field: Fungal Bloodstream Infections Associated
with a Compounded Intravenous Medication at an Outpatient Oncology Clinic—New York City,
2016, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1274 (2016).
16. Woodcock & Dohm, supra note 3, at 2510.
17. Letter from Monica R. Maxwell, Acting Dir., Office of Pharm. Quality Operations, Div.
II, to Jack R. Munn, Guardian Pharmacy Servs. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforce
mentactions/warningletters/2017/ucm586119.htm.
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pharmacy Owner and Director of Compliance
Charged with Defrauding United States and Distributing Adulterated Drugs (June 22, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdin/pr/pharmacy-owner-and-director-compliance-charged-defraud
ing-united-states-and-1.
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tion after receiving super-potent compounded products from a com-
pounding pharmacy in South Dakota.19
Other adverse events have resulted from compounders using unsafe
ingredients to make new drugs. For example, in 2014, patients in sev-
eral states experienced adverse events after receiving adulterated and
misbranded drugs from a compounding pharmacy in New York.20
Similarly, in 2017, two patients in California suffered acute reactions
and one died after receiving compounded IV solutions that contained
a product not suitable for human consumption.21
The FDA reports that it has found unsanitary conditions or other
violations in most of the 425 compounding pharmacies it has inspected
after enactment of the DQSA, including dead insects, mold, and dog
hair in the supposedly sterile compounding areas.22 During this same
period, the FDA has overseen over 140 recalls of compounded
drugs.23 Thus, although the DQSA may have increased regulation of
compounding pharmacies, the pharmacies continue to pose a signifi-
cant risk for patients receiving compounded drugs.
B. Risks to Innovation and Competition
In addition to creating public health risks, compounding pharmacies
also pose a risk to innovation. The FDCA prohibits the compounding
of drugs that are “essentially copies” of FDA-approved drugs unless
there is a drug shortage.24 This restriction ensures that patients are not
needlessly exposed to drugs held to a lower regulatory standard when
their needs could be more safely met with an FDA-approved drug.
The restriction also preserves the incentives for brand drug makers to
develop innovative new drugs. It currently costs approximately $2.6
billion to develop and bring each new drug to market with FDA ap-
19. U.S. Illnesses and Deaths Associated with Compounded Medications or Repackaged Medi-
cations, supra note 13.
20. Letter from Ronald M. Pace, Dist. Dir., New York Dist. Food & Drug Admin., to Antonio
Dos Santos, President, Medisca Pharmaceutique, Inc. (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/iceci/
enforcementactions/warningletters/2015/ucm474892.htm.
21. FDA Investigates Two Serious Adverse Events Associated with ImprimisRx’s Compounded
Curcumin Emulsion Product for Injection, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm
570192.htm.
22. See Woodcock & Dohm, supra note 3, at 2510.
23. See id.
24. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UCM510154, COMPOUNDED DRUG PRODUCTS THAT ARE
ESSENTIALLY COPIES OF A COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE DRUG PRODUCT UNDER SECTION 503A
OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2018) [herein-
after UCM510154].
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proval.25 Traditional drug makers would be less likely to invest in this
costly drug development if compounding pharmacies could compound
a similar substitute drug.26 These substitute drugs could be sold at a
significantly lower price because the compounding pharmacy would
not have to incorporate the $2.6 billion cost of development into their
pricing of the drug. Put simply, brand drug makers would not invest in
developing new drugs if compounding pharmacies could free ride on
their investment.
Even generic drug makers would be reluctant to invest in bringing
new generics to market.27 Currently, generic drug makers must submit
to the FDA an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) for ap-
proval of a generic drug. Generic drug makers that demonstrate their
drug is bioequivalent to a brand drug can rely on the brand drug
maker’s previously submitted safety and efficacy data,28 making the
FDA approval process significantly faster and cheaper for generic
drugs. However, even though the cost of bringing a new generic drug
to market is only $1 to $2 million,29 generic drug makers would be less
likely to make this investment if compounding pharmacies could com-
pound similar drugs without going through the ANDA process.
Nevertheless, in violation of federal law, some rogue compounders
are mass producing compounded drugs that are essentially copies of
commercially-available drugs.30 The FDA has indicated that, in its in-
spections, it has found numerous compounding facilities that “were
engaged in large-scale, non-patient specific compounding like a con-
ventional manufacturer, without complying with premarket approval,
labeling, and CGMP requirements for their drugs.”31 These facilities
25. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of
R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016).
26. Scott Gottlieb, 2018 Compounding Policies Priority Plan, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Jan. 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Pharmacy
Compounding/ucm592795.htm.
27. Id.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(iv) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
29. Expanding the Use of Generic Drugs, ASPE ISSUE BRIEF (Office Assistant Sec’y for Plan-
ning & Evaluation, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1, 2010; Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Prod-
uct Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries 7, 13 (Duke Univ., Dep’t of
Econ., Working Paper No. 2-25, 2002) (“Generic firms can file an Abbreviated New Drug Appli-
cation (or ANDA), a process that takes only a few years and typically costs a few million
dollars.”).
30. Jeff Overley, ‘Seminal’ Allergan Cases Test Copycat Drug Limits, LAW360 (Nov. 27, 2017,
11:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/986982/-seminal-allergan-cases-test-copycat-drug-
limits.
31. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UCM536549, FDA’S HUMAN DRUG COMPOUNDING PRO-
GRESS REPORT: THREE YEARS AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE DRUG QUALITY & SECURITY
ACT 12 (2017) [hereinafter UCM536549].
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put patients at risk by needlessly exposing them to unapproved drugs
and jeopardize drug innovation by reducing manufacturers’ incentives
to invest in the development of new products.
Part of the problem has stemmed from the FDA’s policy on which
ingredients can be used to compound drugs in 503B outsourcing facili-
ties. Compounders can create new drugs by either altering an FDA-
approved drug or starting fresh with a “bulk drug substance” (an ac-
tive pharmaceutical ingredient) when the FDA-approved drug is med-
ically inappropriate. Since the DQSA’s enactment in 2013, the FDA
has been working to establish a list of allowable bulk drug substances
and has recently issued guidance designed to limit the situations in
which bulk drug substances can be used in compounding and the spe-
cific substances that are approved for use.32 However, in the interim
until the list is finalized, the FDA has generally allowed compounding
with any drug substance that a compounder has nominated for the
final list as long as it was nominated with sufficient information for the
FDA to eventually evaluate the substance and it does not present a
significant safety risk.33
Thus, the interim policy has authorized compounders to create
drugs using many ingredients that have not yet been properly evalu-
ated. Moreover, many compounders have exploited the interim policy
to effectively recreate FDA-approved drugs using bulk drug sub-
stances. Under the DQSA, Congress intended that a bulk drug sub-
stance could not be used for compounding in a 503B outsourcing
facility unless there was a clinical need determined after a notice and
comment period.34 This notice and comment period would allow other
drug makers to challenge the nomination of a bulk drug substance
when, for example, an existing FDA-approved drug could meet the
clinical need. However, under the interim policy, there is no official
mechanism to oppose the nomination of a bulk drug substance before
it is used in compounding. Instead, the only way to challenge the use
of a bulk drug substance is through litigation such as that recently
filed by Par Pharmaceutical, a unit of Endo International Plc. Par’s
lawsuit claims that the FDA’s interim policy has resulted in the nomi-
nation and use of the ingredient vasopressin by compounder QuVa
32. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UCM602276, EVALUATION OF BULK DRUG SUBSTANCES
NOMINATED FOR USE IN COMPOUNDING UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG,
AND COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 6, 8 (2019) [hereinafter UCM602276].
33. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UCM469122, INTERIM POLICY ON COMPOUNDING USING
BULK DRUG SUBSTANCES UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COS-
METIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1, 5, 7 (2017) [hereinafter UCM469122].
34. Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, § 102(a)(2)(A), 127 Stat. 587
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (Supp. V 2018)).
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Pharma to create a new drug that is essentially a copy of Par’s pat-
ented product Vasostrict. Vasostrict is the only FDA-approved drug
containing vasopressin, and Par claims there is no evidence that
Vasostrict is medically inappropriate for any patients. Thus, Par as-
serts that QuVa Pharma is using the loophole in the FDA’s interim
policy to evade pre-market approval and circumvent federal patent
laws.35
C. Fraud Concerns
The lack of regulatory oversight of compounding pharmacies has
also invited fraud into the industry. Several pharmacies have been
prosecuted for schemes to defraud insurers or the federal government
into paying hundreds of millions of excess dollars for compounded
drugs. The schemes generally involve compounding pharmacies charg-
ing payors exorbitant prices for compounded drugs that are medically
unnecessary or not dispensed at all.36 Oftentimes, physicians are paid
kickbacks to write prescriptions for the compounded drug and to di-
rect patients to the pharmacy involved in the scheme.37 For example,
in 2016, the Department of Justice named twenty-two defendants in
insurance fraud cases that generated over $160 million in fraudulent
reimbursements from Medicare and TRICARE38 for compounded
drugs.39 In 2017, the owner of a Florida compounding pharmacy
pleaded guilty to generating over $100 million in fraudulent reim-
bursements from Medicare, TRICARE, and private insurers.40 In
2018, the Department of Justice filed claims against a compounding
pharmacy, two pharmacy executives, and a private equity firm for de-
35. Complaint at ¶¶ 9, 10, 55, Par Sterile Products LLC v. Hargan, No. 1:17-cv-02221 (D.D.C.
Oct. 26, 2017).
36. Julie Appleby, Fraud Concerns Emerge as Compounding Drug Sales Skyrocket, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (July 18, 2016), https://khn.org/news/fraud-concerns-emerge-as-compounding-
drug-sales-skyrocket.
37. Sheldon Bradshaw, Practitioners Take Huge Risks Dealing with Rogue Drug Compound-
ers, 16 J. DRUGS DERMATOLOGY 1308, 1310 (2017).
38. TRICARE is the health care program for the U.S. military. What is TRICARE?, TRI-
CARE, https://tricare.com/what-is-tricare/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
39. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office Cent. Dist. of Cal., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 22 Defend-
ants Named in Healthcare Fraud Cases Involving over $161 million in Fraudulent Bills to Gov-
ernment Healthcare Programs (June 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/22-
defendants-named-health-care-fraud-cases-involving-over-161-million-fraudulent-bills.
40. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Owner of Florida Pharmacy
Pleads Guilty in $100 Million Compounding Pharmacy Fraud Scheme; Real Properties, Cars and
a 50-Foot Boat Will Be Forfeited (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/owner-florida-
pharmacy-pleads-guilty-100-million-compounding-pharmacy-fraud-scheme-real.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 10 27-MAR-19 12:33
394 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:385
frauding TRICARE out of tens of millions of dollars for compounded
drugs.41
These and other fraudulent schemes impose hundreds of millions of
dollars of unnecessary costs on the government, insurers, employers,
and taxpayers. From 2006 to 2015, Medicare Part D’s spending on
compounded drugs grew by 625%, with spending on compounded
creams and gels increasing by 3,466%.42 TRICARE’s spending on
compounded drugs increased by over 34,000% from 2004 to 2015,
from $5 million to $1.75 billion.43 State Workers’ Compensation Plans
have also experienced dramatic increases in reimbursements for com-
pounded drugs; for example, the Texas Division of Workers’ Compen-
sation experienced a 46.4% increase in prescriptions for compounded
drugs from 2010 to 2014.44 The various agencies charged with investi-
gating insurance fraud fear a significant share of this spending in-
crease is the result of fraud.45 Although traditional pharmacies have
also been involved in insurance fraud schemes, the lack of regulatory
oversight over drug compounding exacerbates the risk of fraud in
compounding pharmacies.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF COMPOUNDING FACILITIES
Under the FDCA, both brand name and generic drugs must be safe
and effective and manufactured in accordance with CGMPs in order
to obtain FDA approval.46 CGMPs are federal statutes governing the
manufacturing, packaging, labeling, testing, and distribution of phar-
maceutical products. These statutes ensure the drugs’ identity,
strength, quality, and purity.47 The FDA regularly inspects drug manu-
facturing facilities to ensure compliance with CGMPs. In contrast to
manufacturing facilities that are regulated by the FDA, compounding
41. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Files False
Claims Act Complaint Against Compounding Pharmacy, Private Equity Firm, and Two Phar-
macy Executives Alleging Payment of Kickbacks (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
united-states-files-false-claims-act-complaint-against-compounding-pharmacy-private-equity.
42. See Appleby, supra note 36.
43. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office Middle Dist. of Fla., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Govern-
ment Intervenes in Lawsuit Against Florida Compounding Pharmacy for Excess Charges to
TRICARE (July 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/government-intervenes-lawsuit-
against-florida-compounding-pharmacy-excessive-charges.
44. Don Lipsy, Curbing Prescription Drug Compounding in Workers’ Compensation,
PROPERTYCASUALTY360 (Feb. 6, 2018, 1:30 AM), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2018/02/
06/curbing-prescription-drug-compounding-in-workers-c.
45. Scott R. Grubman & Samuel M. Shapiro, Compounding the Problem: The Government
Cracks Down on Compounding Pharmacy Fraud and Abuse, CHI. MED., May 2016, at 14.
46. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2012).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 11 27-MAR-19 12:33
2019] REGULATORY GAPS IN DRUG COMPOUNDING 395
pharmacies are generally regulated by state boards of pharmacy and
are exempt from CGMPs.48
In response to the growth in compounding and concerns over com-
pounded drugs in the 1990s, Congress enacted the FDA Moderniza-
tion Act (FDMA) in 1997 that added the new FDCA Section 503A.49
Section 503A clarified the FDA’s position on regulating compounded
drugs by establishing the conditions under which compounded drugs
would be exempt from certain requirements of the FDCA—the new
drug approval process, labeling requirements, and CGMP require-
ments.50 Section 503A exempts drugs from these FDCA requirements
if they are compounded by a licensed pharmacist or physician upon
receipt of a valid prescription for an identified patient, or in limited
quantities before the receipt of a valid prescription based on a history
of compounding orders from patients with whom the compounder has
an established relationship.51 Section 503A also prohibits com-
pounding, regularly or in inordinate amounts, drugs that are essen-
tially copies of a commercially-available drug unless there is a drug
shortage.52
Following the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak and growing con-
cerns about the safety of compounded drugs, Congress enacted the
Compounding Quality Act as part of the DQSA.53 The DQSA added
the new FDCA Section 503B that delineates a new category of drug
compounding facilities—outsourcing facilities—that do not qualify for
exemptions under Section 503A because they compound in large
quantities without identified patient prescriptions.54 Thus, the DQSA
48. Jennifer Gudeman et al., Potential Risks of Pharmacy Compounding, 13 DRUGS R&D 1, 2
(2013).
49. Gerald Gianutsos, Regulatory and Safety Issues in Compounding, U.S. PHARMACIST, Oct.
2015, at 63, 67.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 353a(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
51. Id. The FDA interprets the advance prescription requirement to restrict 503A pharmacies
from compounding drugs to be held by hospitals, clinics, or health care practitioners for “office
use.” These health care entities can obtain and stock compounded drugs from 503B outsourcing
facilities that are permitted to compound in large quantities without identified patient prescrip-
tions. The restriction against 503A pharmacies compounding for office use not only protects
patients by ensuring that they get compounded drugs from more strictly regulated facilities, it
also encourages 503A pharmacies that would like to compound drugs for office use to transition
to 503B status. However, to prevent drug shortages at hospitals, clinics, or health care practition-
ers, the FDA should allow 503A compounders to supply specified compounded drugs during any
period when they are unavailable from 503B outsourcing facilities. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
UCM496286, PRESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 503A OF THE FEDERAL FOOD,
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2016).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 353a(b)(1)(D) (2012).
53. Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (Supp. V 2018)).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(d)(4)(A)–(C) (Supp. V 2018).
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effectively divides compounding facilities into those regulated by Sec-
tion 503A (“503A compounding pharmacies”) and those regulated by
Section 503B (“503B outsourcing facilities”), with the key distinction
being whether the facility compounds large quantities of drugs before
receiving individual prescriptions.
Section 503B establishes the conditions under which drugs com-
pounded in outsourcing facilities are exempt from the FDA’s new
drug approval process, from labeling requirements, and from supply
chain track-and-trace requirements.55 Unlike 503A compounding
pharmacies, 503B outsourcing facilities are subject to CGMP require-
ments, registration with the FDA,56 enhanced risk-based FDA inspec-
tions,57 and adverse event reporting.58 Thus, 503B outsourcing
facilities are regulated more like the manufacturers of traditional
drugs. Outsourcing facilities are also prohibited from using a bulk
drug substance (i.e., active pharmaceutical ingredient) to compound a
new drug unless either the Secretary of Health and Human Services
has determined there is a clinical need for the bulk drug substance or
there is a shortage in effect for the drug compounded from the bulk
drug substance.59 Like 503A compounding pharmacies, 503B out-
sourcing facilities are prohibited from compounding drugs that are es-
sentially copies of available drugs unless there is a shortage of that
drug.60
III. REGULATORY GAPS IN DRUG COMPOUNDING
Compounded drugs face significantly less regulatory scrutiny than
do traditional drugs. Traditional drug manufacturers must undergo the
arduous FDA approval process and prove that their drugs are safe and
effective before marketing them to the public. In contrast, compound-
ers need not obtain FDA approval for their drugs before selling them.
Because of the different pre-market approval requirements, com-
pounded drugs are inherently riskier than traditional new drugs.
Another regulatory gap exists in the lax oversight of 503A com-
pounding pharmacies. Like traditional manufacturing facilities, 503B
outsourcing facilities must meet CGMP requirements, face routine in-
spection by the FDA to ensure compliance, and report adverse events
to the FDA. In contrast, 503A compounding pharmacies do not have
55. Id. § 353b(a).
56. Id. § 353b(b)(1) and (3).
57. Id. § 353b(b)(4).
58. Id. § 353b(b)(5).
59. Id. § 353b(a)(2)(A).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a)(5).
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to meet CGMP requirements or report adverse events to the FDA.61
Although 503A pharmacies deemed high-risk may be inspected by the
FDA, the pharmacies are not subject to routine FDA inspection.62
Moreover, whereas traditional manufacturers and 503B outsourcing
facilities are supervised by the FDA, 503A compounding pharmacies
are primarily overseen by state regulatory bodies. This state supervi-
sion of 503A compounding pharmacies is generally less consistent and
comprehensive than FDA supervision.63 A 2015 survey of state regu-
latory bodies tasked with supervising compounding pharmacies in 43
states revealed that only 24 states routinely tracked in-state pharma-
cies dispensing compounded drugs, and only 19 states tracked out-of-
state pharmacies shipping compounded drugs into the state.64 Thus,
approximately half of the states did not even track which pharmacies
are engaged in compounding drugs. Moreover, only about one-third
of states required compounding pharmacies to have a patient-specific
prescription in advance of compounding, which is the primary require-
ment differentiating 503A from 503B facilities under federal law.65 In
addition, only about half of the states required compounding pharma-
cies to meet well-established production quality standards for com-
pounding,66 and only 40% of states required compounding pharmacies
to report adverse events or reactions to the FDA or state regulatory
bodies.67 A 2018 update found that the percentage of states requiring
compounding pharmacies to meet well-established production quality
standards increased from roughly half to over 85%,68 and the percent-
age of states requiring compounding pharmacies to have a patient-
specific prescription in advance of compounding increased from about
35% to 78%.69 However, the report found a decline in state inspec-
61. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UCM514666, INSANITARY CONDITIONS AT COMPOUNDING
FACILITIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1, 2 (2016).
62. DABROWSKA, supra note 2, at 8.
63. Best Practices for State Oversight of Drug Compounding, PEW CHARITABLE TR. 1–3 (Mar.
2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/02/best_practices_for-state_oversight_of_
drug_compounding.pdf.
64. A. Simon Pickard et al., National Assessment of State Oversight of Sterile Drug Com-
pounding, PEW CHARITABLE TR. 1, 13 (Feb. 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/
2016/02/national_assessment_of_state_oversight_of_sterile_drug_compounding.pdf.
65. Id. at 15–16.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 12–13.
68. State Oversight of Drug Compounding: Major Progress Since 2015, But Opportunities Re-
main to Better Protect Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TR. & NAT’L ASS’N BDS. PHARMACY 1, 5–6
(Feb. 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/02/drug_safety_assesment_web.pdf.
69. Id. at 10–12.
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tions of compounding pharmacies; whereas 26 states conducted rou-
tine inspections in 2015, only 22 states did in the updated study.70
The disparity between the regulatory oversight of 503B outsourcing
facilities compared to 503A compounding pharmacies creates strong
incentives for unscrupulous compounding facilities coming under the
503B requirements to neglect to register as such. Moreover, the states
do not consistently ensure that facilities claiming to be 503A com-
pounding pharmacies meet the 503A requirements. As a result, many
compounding facilities that should be supervised by the FDA as 503B
outsourcing facilities are able to slip through the cracks and identify as
503A compounding pharmacies. Although the exact number of com-
pounding facilities evading their regulatory responsibilities is un-
known, routine FDA inspections suggest that the scope of the
problem could be substantial. In 2016, the FDA explained that “[o]ur
experience was that in the substantial majority of cases, inspected
human drug compounders not registered as outsourcing facilities were
compounding at least some of their drugs not in accordance with
[S]ection 503A.”71 Of the over 7,500 compounding pharmacies across
the country, only 73 of them have elected to register as 503B outsourc-
ing facilities.72 This evasion of regulatory responsibility combined with
the lax and inconsistent state supervision of 503A compounding phar-
macies exposes patients to unnecessary risk.
IV. CLOSING THE REGULATORY GAPS IN COMPOUNDING
Compounded drugs that have not been approved by the FDA for
safety and efficacy inherently pose greater risk to patients than FDA-
approved drugs. However, several measures implemented by federal
and state regulators could reduce the unnecessary risk arising from
the regulatory gaps of compounding pharmacies.
A. Encouraging Transition of Compounders to 503B Outsourcing
Facilities
The current disparity between the obligations and oversight of 503B
outsourcing facilities compared to 503A compounding pharmacies
gives compounders a strong disincentive to register as 503B facilities.
Indeed, some compounders are skirting the law by improperly self-
70. Id. at 13.
71. Notice, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN 1, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecom
plianceregulatoryinformation/pharmacycompounding/ucm510684.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
72. Registered Outsourcing Facilities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm378645.htm (last up-
dated Feb. 19, 2019).
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identifying as 503A compounding pharmacies; the FDA has stated
that in the “substantial majority” of its routine inspections of 503A
pharmacies, it has found compounding practices that exceed those al-
lowed under Section 503A.73
The patients of these unscrupulous pharmacies are exposed to un-
necessary risk from drugs compounded in 503A pharmacies as op-
posed to drugs compounded in 503B facilities because regulation of
503A pharmacies is lax and oversight is inconsistent. Unlike 503B fa-
cilities, 503A pharmacies need not meet CGMP requirements in their
manufacturing of compounded drugs, report adverse events, or un-
dergo routine FDA inspections. Thus, drugs compounded in 503A
pharmacies pose a greater risk to patient safety than drugs com-
pounded in the more strictly regulated 503B facilities.74
To prevent compounders from skirting the law, state and federal
regulators should increase inspections of self-identified 503A com-
pounding pharmacies to confirm that they do indeed qualify for ex-
emptions under Section 503A. Regulators should also increase the
penalties imposed against compounders that knowingly try to circum-
vent the law. Increased inspections and enhanced penalties for non-
compliance would deter many unscrupulous pharmacies from neglect-
ing to register as a 503B facility.
In addition, in order to reduce the burden of registering as a 503B
outsourcing facility, the FDA should introduce more flexible produc-
tion requirements and enforcement measures that reflect the risk of
facilities’ compounding activities. For example, outsourcing facilities
compounding smaller amounts of low-risk drugs should be subject to
less onerous reporting and inspection requirements than facilities
compounding riskier drugs or dispensing large quantities of com-
pounded drugs. These and similar steps will reduce the burdens im-
posed on 503B outsourcing facilities and encourage some
compounding facilities to transition to 503B status. The FDA has indi-
cated that it plans to issue revised guidance and regulations that would
allow for more flexibility in required production standards and FDA
enforcement for 503B outsourcing facilities.75 Ultimately, the more
compounding facilities subject to FDA oversight instead of inconsis-
tent or lax state regulatory oversight, the lower the risks to patient
safety.
73. Notice, supra note 71.
74. UCM536549, supra note 31, at 8.
75. Gottlieb, supra note 26.
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B. Restricting Compounded Copies of FDA-Approved Drugs
Both Sections 503A and 503B prohibit compounding facilities from
compounding drugs that are essentially copies of FDA-approved or
commercially-available products unless there is a drug shortage. Nev-
ertheless, some rogue compounders mass-produce compounded drugs
that are essentially copies of commercially-available drugs.76 These
compounders are exploiting and profiting from the disparate
premarket approval requirements facing traditional manufacturers.
Compounded copies expose patients to unnecessary risk and
threaten innovation in the drug industry. Commercially-available
drugs that have undergone FDA safety reviews and premarket inspec-
tion of manufacturing quality are far safer than compounded drugs.77
Indeed, several adverse events investigated by the FDA have involved
drugs that were essentially copies of commercially-available drugs, in-
cluding the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak that sickened over 800
people and caused more than 60 deaths.78 As a result, the FDA has
concluded that “[b]ecause they are subject to a lower regulatory stan-
dard, compounded drugs should only be distributed to meet the needs
of patients whose medical needs cannot be met by an FDA-approved
drug.”79
In addition, compounded drugs that are essentially copies of FDA-
approved drugs threaten incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers, either brand name or generic, will
have less incentive to invest millions or billions of dollars in new drug
development if compounding facilities can effectively free ride off of
their investment and sell copies of their drugs. Thus, the FDA has
stated that restrictions against compounded copies “protect the incen-
tives for conventional drug manufacturers to pursue research and to
develop FDA-approved drugs.”80
The FDA recently issued two guidance documents to reiterate its
position against compounded products that are essentially copies of
commercially-available drugs and are compounded regularly or in in-
ordinate amounts.81 The documents clarified that the FDA will con-
sider a drug to be essentially a copy of a commercially-available drug
if it has the same active pharmaceutical ingredient in a similar dosage
76. See, e.g., Overley, supra note 30.
77. UCM510154, supra note 24, at 1, 3.
78. Id.
79. Gottlieb, supra note 26.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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strength and can be used by the same route of administration.82 Prod-
ucts compounded in violation of the restriction against copies do not
qualify for the Section 503A or Section 503B exemptions. The FDA
has also signaled its intention to block copycat drugs in recent draft
guidance that limits the situations in which bulk drug substances can
be used and restricts the specific substances that are approved for
use.83
Strict enforcement of restrictions against compounded drugs that
are essentially copies of FDA-approved drugs will protect patient
safety and safeguard incentives to invest in new drug development.
Enhanced penalties for knowing violations, such as revocation of re-
gistration or significant fines, will punish wrongdoers and deter future
violations. In addition, because traditional drug manufacturers are the
ones most likely to know when compounders are making copies of
their drugs, the FDA should create a formal mechanism for them to
report violations.
C. Improving Regulation of Bulk Drug Substances
The FDA has been working to establish a list of bulk drug sub-
stances allowed in compounding by 503B outsourcing facilities since
the DQSA’s enactment in 2013. Until the list is finalized, the FDA
generally allows compounding with any drug substance that a com-
pounder has nominated for the final list as long as it is nominated with
sufficient information for the FDA to eventually evaluate the sub-
stance and does not present a significant safety risk.84 This interim
policy sharply contrasts with Congress’s intent in the DQSA that a
bulk drug substance could not be used for compounding by a 503B
outsourcing facility unless there was a clinical need determined after a
notice and comment period.85 This notice and comment period was
intended to allow other industry participants to challenge the nomina-
tion of a bulk drug substance when, for example, a safer FDA-ap-
proved drug could meet the clinical need. In contrast, under the
interim policy, there is no formal mechanism to oppose the nomina-
tion of a bulk drug substance before it is used in compounding.
This interim policy exposes patients to unnecessary risk by allowing
compounding with ingredients that have not yet been properly evalu-
ated for safety and quality. As the FDA explains: “There are fewer
82. UCM510154, supra note 24, at 5–6.
83. See generally UCM602276, supra note 32.
84. UCM469122, supra note 33, at 5–8.
85. Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, § 102(a)(2)(A), 127 Stat. 587,
588 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (Supp. V 2018)).
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assurances of safety and quality associated with a bulk drug substance
than with an FDA-approved drug.”86 It also enables compounders to
effectively recreate FDA-approved drugs using bulk drug substances,
“undermin[ing] the drug approval process by reducing the incentive
for drug manufacturers to seek approval of brand or generic drugs.”87
Moreover, some compounders are flagrantly violating the interim pol-
icy by compounding with ingredients that have not even been nomi-
nated to the final list.88
The FDA should strictly enforce violations of the interim policy to
reduce patients’ exposure to unsafe ingredients. In addition, rather
than wait until the bulk drug substances list is finalized, the FDA
should create a mechanism to allow challenges to the ingredients
under the interim policy. This mechanism would align with Congress’s
intent to allow bulk drug substances to be used in compounding by
503B outsourcing facilities only after they have gone through a notice
and comment period. Allowing challenges will also provide more in-
formation to the FDA as it determines the safety and clinical need of
bulk ingredients.
D. Increasing FDA Oversight of Compounding Facilities
Since the enactment of DQSA in 2013, the FDA has conducted
more than 425 inspections of compounding facilities, including both
routine inspections of 503B outsourcing facilities and risk-based in-
spections of 503A compounding pharmacies. From these inspections,
the FDA has issued more than 160 warning letters advising com-
pounders of violations of federal law or unsanitary conditions. The
FDA follows up on these letters by making sure the facilities have
taken appropriate corrective actions. The FDA has also overseen over
140 recalls of compounded drugs due to possible contamination or
86. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Got-
tlieb, M.D., on a Key Step in Advancing FDA’s Oversight of Drug Compounding and Imple-
menting New Laws Governing Outsourcing Facilities (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm602316.htm.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., FDA Investigates Two Serious Adverse Events Associated with ImprimisRx’s
Compounded Curcumin Emulsion Product for Injection, supra note 21. Curcumin has not been
nominated for the 503B bulk drug substances list. See Bulk Drug Substances Nominated for Use
in Compounding Under Section 503B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInforma
tion/PharmacyCompounding/UCM467374.pdf (last updated Mar. 1, 2019); see also Letter from
Ron Pace, Dist. Dir., N.Y. Dist. Food & Drug Admin., to Alfonse Muto, Owner, Pine Pharmacy
& Home Care Products Ctr., Inc. (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementAc
tions/WarningLetters/2015/ucm434868.htm (showing that domperidone and Brilliant Blue G
have not been nominated to the 503B bulk drug substances list).
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other drug quality issues.89 The enhanced FDA oversight of com-
pounding facilities required under the DQSA has been effective in
reducing some of the risk associated with compounded drugs. Many
compounders have taken corrective actions to improve production
conditions that could lead to contamination, and others have volunta-
rily recalled potentially contaminated drugs and halted production un-
til corrective actions could be taken.90 Yet much remains to be done to
protect patient safety.
Compounding pharmacies continue to engage in compounding
under unsanitary conditions. In recent inspections of compounding fa-
cilities, the FDA has observed “dog beds and dog hairs in close prox-
imity to a sterile compounding room, dead insects in ceilings,
renovations made without any evidence of controls to protect sterile
drugs from contamination, and use of coffee filters to filter particu-
lates.”91 Adverse events from compounding continue to jeopardize
patient safety. As recently as 2017, the FDA has responded to the
following case reports: at least 43 patients in Texas that experienced
vision loss after receiving compounded eye injections, 2 patients in
California (including 1 who died) that had severe reactions to a com-
pounded injectable not suitable for human use, 1 patient in Texas that
experienced paralysis from a compounded injectable, 41 patients in
New Jersey that experienced septic arthritis from a contaminated
compounded injectable, 1 patient in New Jersey that experienced reti-
nal vascular occlusion and hemorrhage from a compounded inject-
able, and 2 patients in Florida that experienced tissue erosion from a
compounded injectable.92
An increase in FDA inspections of both 503B outsourcing facilities
and 503A compounding pharmacies engaging in risky compounding
would bring to light additional problematic conditions. To facilitate
the FDA’s assessment of pharmacies’ risk levels, both the FDA and
state regulators should cooperate in the collection and exchange of
information that is relevant to the compounding risk. For example,
enhanced recordkeeping about adverse events, types of compounded
drugs, quantity of compounded drugs dispensed, compounded drugs
shipped across state lines, and production processes will assist the
89. See Woodcock & Dohm, supra note 3, at 2510.
90. UCM536549, supra note 31, at 3.
91. Id.
92. Woodcock & Dohm, supra note 3, at 2510; U.S. Illnesses and Deaths Associated with Com-
pounded Medications or Repacked Medications, 2001–17, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June 23, 2017),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2017/us-illnesses-and-deaths-associat
ed-with-compounded-medications-or-repackaged-medications (noting that the “chart was up-
dated in February 2019 to include newly reported adverse events”).
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FDA in risk assessment. Ultimately, better information tracking and
more FDA inspections will reduce the ability of 503A compounding
pharmacies to exploit the regulatory gaps that currently put patient
safety at risk.
E. Expanding State Oversight of 503A Compounding Pharmacies
Even with enhanced FDA oversight, many compounders will con-
tinue to be overseen by state regulatory bodies. Yet, over fifty percent
of states currently do not conduct routine inspections of 503A com-
pounding pharmacies. Fifteen percent of states do not require com-
pounding pharmacies to meet well-established production quality
standards. Twenty percent of states do not require pharmacies to have
a patient-specific prescription in advance of compounding (even
though an advance prescription is generally required under federal
law).93 With such lax and inconsistent oversight, unsafe and unlawful
compounding practices are sure to occur, imperiling patient safety.
While the FDA should focus its oversight efforts on 503B outsourc-
ing facilities and high-risk 503A compounding pharmacies, states
should improve their routine supervision of low-risk compounders
that meet the conditions for 503A exemption. More consistent and
stringent supervision of 503A compounding pharmacies by state regu-
latory bodies will reduce the disparate oversight between 503B and
503A facilities, improving drug safety and quality. In addition, devot-
ing more state funding to the regulation of compounding pharmacies
will eliminate some regulators’ claims that inadequate “financial re-
sources and inspection capacity”94 preclude them from conducting
routine inspections.
Although the FDA and some states are taking steps to develop best
practices for supervising 503A compounding pharmacies, more work
must be done to establish consistent approaches among the states.95
Consistent practices will ensure that the FDA can focus its oversight
efforts on the high-risk compounding practices while states conduct
the routine oversight of low-risk compounders within their borders
and appropriately communicate problems to the FDA.
CONCLUSION
Drug compounding has grown from an occasional practice of local
pharmacists to a sizable industry with over 7,500 specialized com-
93. State Oversight of Drug Compounding, supra note 68, at 5, 11–13.
94. State Oversight of Drug Compounding, supra note 68, at 2.
95. Gottlieb, supra note 26.
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pounding pharmacies and 40 million annual prescriptions for com-
pounded drugs. Unfortunately, as compounding has expanded, it has
effectively outgrown the regulatory structure developed when the in-
dustry was in its infancy. The resulting gaps in regulation have led to
drug safety problems, fraudulent practices, and anticompetitive
behaviors.
This Article advocates for several specific proposals to close these
regulatory gaps. In general, more consistent and thorough inspections
of compounders by both the FDA and state agencies will identify
problematic conditions and mitigate some of the risk associated with
compounded drugs. Increased inspections of self-identified 503A com-
pounding pharmacies will also confirm that the facilities do indeed
qualify for 503A status. In addition, greater communication and coop-
eration between state agencies and the FDA will help to identify and
monitor facilities engaged in risky compounding and to ensure more
consistent oversight of these facilities. Enhanced penalties for non-
compliance—such as compounding unnecessary copies of FDA-ap-
proved drugs, improperly self-identifying as a 503A compounding
pharmacy, and violating the bulk drug substances interim policy—will
protect patients from unnecessary exposure to risky drugs and safe-
guard incentives for new drug development. Finally, a formal mecha-
nism to allow industry participants to notify the FDA of illegal
compounded copies and to challenge nominations for the bulk drug
substances list will provide important information to the FDA and
promote patient safety. Ultimately, these or similar measures will pro-
tect patients, payors, and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
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